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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
<~EORGE L. BELL, et al, 
Plain tiffs-Respmul ent", ! 
vs. , Case No. 
I 10709 
BUD FA VERO and :MAURICE .) 
RICHARDS, 
Defendants-Appellants. ; 
BRIEF OF A.PPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF.CASE 
The appellants, Bud Favero and Maurice Richards, 
two of three elected Commissioners of Weber County, 
appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Weber 
County, the Honorable Lewis Jones, Judge of the 
First District, sitting at request without jury, award-
ing respondent judgment against each defendant in 
the sum of Seven Hundred Seventy Seven Dollars, 
fiftr eents, ($777.50), One Thousand Five Hundred 
l 
Fifty Five ($1,555.00) Dollars in total, plus sorr 
costs, for allegedly making an ultra vires appropratir,, 
of public funds in violation of 17-5-13, Utah Code At 
notated, 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT 
On March l, 1966, George L. Bell, a taxpayerani 
resident of Weber County, filed a complaint in th 
District Court of Weber County, State of Utah, agairu1 
Bud Favero and Maurice Richards, Weber Coun~ 
Commissioners. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant· 
had improperly and illegally appropriated certaill 
public funds for football admission tickets for privalt 
individuals. A further allegation was contained in lli 
complaint that the actions of the defendants were dom 
fraudulently. The plaintiff sought recovery of $600.~~ 
allegedly appropriated by the defendants and a $500.~~ 
forfeiture under the provisions of 17-5-13, Utah Coat 
Annotated, 1953. A motion to strike was filed anu 
denied and an answer duly entered by the defendants. 
Discovery was perfected by both parties and the matter 
tried to the Honorable Lewis Jones, District Judgr 
of the First Judicial District, sitting upon request 
Subsequent to the receipt of the evidence, Judge Jone· 
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against tne 
defendants, finding however, that in the alleged appro· 
priation was not fraudulently made. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants submit the decision of the trial court 
should be reversed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are relatively undisputed. Mr. Gary 
Crompton, the athletic business manager of Weber 
State College, testified that he approached the Weber 
County Commissioners for the purpose of getting them 
to purchase an ad in the football programs of 'V eber 
State College (Tr. 6). He indicated that the Com-
missioners stated that they didn't want to put an ad 
in the programs even though it had been the general 
practice in the past, but that they indicated they wanted 
to help the college (Tr. 7). They felt that putting an 
ad in a football program was political (Tr. 7). There 
were several meetings held between Mr. Crompton 
and one or more of the Commissioners and as an end 
result the county purchased 50 season, reserved tickets 
at 'Veber State College football games for the sum 
of $600.00 (Tr. 8). Mr. Crompton testified that he was 
under the impression that the Commissioners wanted 
to help the school more than they had done in the past 
(Tr. 11). Crompton told the Commissioners that there 
were approximately three ways that they could help. 
The first way was by placing an ad in the football 
programs ; the second, by making a direct scholarship 
to the college; or third, by purchasing football tickets 
and distributing them to county employees in an effort 
3 
to get them to attend the football games as a ,' 
and encourage interest in the Weber State c:r 
athletic program (Tr. 11, Tr. 13-14). Crompton 
1
,: 
the Commissioners that he preferred the purchas~ 
the tickets because he felt it would do more to deyt[ 
the Weber State College athletic program (Tr. Ii 
Mr. Crompton testified that prior to the rn 
football season the college had only sold approximate 
150 reserved season tickets in 1964 out of 1,170 rn 
able. He stated that the money acquired through tic1 
purchases went to the same fund as that used for ath!et 
scholarships for the Weber State College Athletic D, 
partment (Tr. 15). He said that the 1965 season, tl 
season for which the Weber County Commissionersk 
purchased the tickets, a 200 % increase in attendan1· 
resulted (Tr. 16). 
Mr. Crompton also testified that payment for Iv 
tickets was made approximately three weeks after! 
had delivered the tickets and that payment was hr 
$600.00 check. He indicated that the cashier at Wek 
State College had received the check and a voucfli: 
on which noted the payment was for a scholarship an: 
he advised the cashier that it should be treated as, 
ticket purchase (Tr. 10). Mr. Thomas H. Jacksor 
the cashier of Weber State College, testified that~· 
credited the $600.00 payment towards ticket sales. 
Commissioner Elmer Carver, a 'Veber Count: 
. · d t def endan Comm1ss1oner, who was not sue as a par Y 
testified that he recalled a meeting in which Mr. CroJJI[ 
4 
gm' ton was present and in which there was discussion about 
:oijt: purchasing football tickets. He indicated, however, 
n 11, he did not approve the purchase, and subsequently, 
as~ \\'hen it was called to his attention, he scanned the min-
eyt[ utes of the formal meetings and was unable to find 
, Ii any formal approval. He stated that although there 
was no budget request made for the tickets as part of 
rn the annual budget it was not uncommon to make ex-
natt penditures for items not budgeted. He testified that 
rn the daim for the purchase of the tickets was handled 
tic& • in the usual and routme way (Tr. 30), and ackow-
th!et. !edged that a lot of claims against the County Treasurer 
ic D· were paid other than at regular meetings and that 
n, tl expenditures could be authorized on the signature 
rsk of one commissioner unless there was some question 
.dani· b I d' d h 1 a out tie expen 1ture an t en two approva s were 
requested (Tr. 29). He stated the reason that he did 
Jr tu not approve the claim was because he was not familiar 
ter! with it, but he didn't question it (Tr. 32). 
hr Donna Adam, an employee of the 'V eber County 
Vek Clerk, who took the regular minutes of the Commis-
iucni: sioners' meetings, testified that according to the minute~ 
Pan Mr. Crompton appeared before the Commission on 
as. the 21st of August, 1965, at which time there was dis-
~ksor cussion relating to the Commissioners putting an ad 
aH in the Weber State College football program and there 
~s. was also discussion relative to obtaining football tickets 
JUDl: for eounty employees at a group rate. She testified 
1dan that she could remember that there was discussion about 
·oJJJ[ helping the eollege and that the claim for the football 
5 
tickets was approved on October 14, 1965, and int],' 
usual routine manner (Tr. 39-42). 
Mr. Dee Wilcox, the 'iV eber County Audito: 
called and testified that generally the purchasing ordt! 
procedure is that the purchasing procedure for item, 
the county needs is that a purchase order is made ur 
and sent to his off ice to determine whether or not the; 
is sufficient funds in the budget to cover the expen~ 
ture. He would normally indicate that there was suff:· 
cient money and the purchase order would go back Ir. 
the purchasing department where the purchase ord11 
was required to be approved by one of the Commb· 
sioners if it was in excess of $100.00. He indicated th~· 1 
the appropriation for the football tickets was approve:! 
by Commissioners Favero and Richards (Tr. 46). Hr! 
indicated that the claim stated that it was "Scholarshir; 
for Weber Athletic Department" (Tr. 46). He irnli· 
cated that the warrant was dated October 13, and tk 
purchase order September 20. He further testifier! 
that subsequent to the time that he found out that fool 
ball tickets he received had been purchased with tllii 
$600.00 funds, he paid back the value of the ticke\i' 
he received as did another individual in his departmen1 
(Tr. 53-54). The amount paid back totaled $45.00. 
Mr. Warren Drury, an employee in the Wek 
County Shops, who serves on the Board of the Webei 
County Employees' Association, indicated that he rr 
ceived tickets from Mr. Al Covieo (Tr. 57). He stat~; 
he was told to go to the football games and join ail' 
6 
assoeiate with the other employees (Tr. 58). He stated 
that he hadn't been before at least for several years 
and as a result of receiving the tickets he purchased 
other tickets and then intended to buy more next year. 
He further testified that at one point plaintiff himself 
wanted to obtain some of the tickets (Tr. 58-59). 
Mr. B. M. Richards, a deputy sheriff who also 
serves as a non-paid member of the \Veber County 
Health Board, testified that he received several tickets 
and he gave some to a District Judge and to em-
ployees of the County Hospital ('l'r. 60-61). He 
received the tickets from Mr. Covieo and he stated that 
Covieo indicated that he was trying to give the tickets 
to people who hadn't attended before and to scatter 
them among the employees of the county (Tr. 61) . 
He stated that as a result of the tickets given him, 
he was "sold" on Weber State College football and 
intended to buy a season ticket (Tr. 62). 
Dr. Rex M. Alvord, a physician, testified that he 
received four tickets and that he used some and gave 
some away. He indicated the tickets had been given to 
him by the President of the County Industrial Bureau. 
The answers to interrogatories proposed by the 
plaintiff were published and received by the court. 
Interrogatory 17 showed that most of the persons re-
ceiving tickets were employed in some positions in the 
county (R. 5). 
In addition Dr. Alvord testified that the attend-
aner at football games had increased by many thou-
7 
sand and that he was especially impressed with tl 
economic value the ticket purchase had for the corul 
munity (Tr. 65-67). Also, Mr. Lowell H. A!v01,. 
testified that he was employed at Hill Air Force Ba1f 
was a member and chairman of the Weber Counli 
Health Board. He received tickets to the Weber Stat, 
College football games, distributed by Mr. Covieo (Tr 
70). He testified that he was present when all tk 
Commissioners discussed the tickets and that he under 
stood that it was their intention that unsalaried em 
ployees be given some of the benefit by the distributior 
of the tickets (Tr. 71). 
Maurice Richards, an appellant and Weber Coun~, 
Commissioner, testified that Mr. Covieo, a general em·I 
ployee and inspector for 'V eber County, had beer: 
designated to handle the relationships with Mr. Crom~ 
ton (Tr. 73). He stated that Crompton wanted to comi 
to the Commission and upon presenting his ideas 111 
the Commission, it appeared that he wanted the Com 
missioners to take an ad in the program. He was advisea 
by the Commissioners that they did not desire to tak 
an ad because they considered it political (Tr. 74i 
He stated that Mr. Crompton then mentioned obtainini. 
tickets and selling them to County employees, but tha1. 
this idea was rejected as involving too much difficuln 1 
(Tr. 75). Crompton stated that the College need~ 
help and he was asking the Commission to help theii 
I 
program. Commissioner Richards testified at severa, 
meetings the question of providing a scholarship for 
between $500 and $700 to the college was discusseJ 
8 
I He stated that he discussed, on the street, with Mr. 
I 
u Crompton the possibility of a $600.00 scholarship being 
1
,, giren directly to the school. Mr. Crompton told Rich-
f ards that he ,,·as interested in building up the athletic 
I,, 
!i fund and that a direct scholarship would not have tha1 
effect (Tr. 76). He listed the ways the Commissioners 
could help the College and suggested the idea of pur-
chasing tickets as a means of developing the athletic 
program (Tr. 76). Subsequent to the meeting on the 
street, two of the Commissioners told Crompton that 
they would go forward with the ticket purchase of 
$600.00. This was on or about the 17th or 18th of 
~' September. Richards said he or Mr. Favero told Mr. 
1 
Covieo to make out a requisition for $600.00 and that 
l·i 
1 as a result a purchase order was prepared, signed and 
tr! 
submitted as a proper claim (Tr. 77). 'Vhen the tickets 
~· first arrived, they were scattered throughout the sta-
m 
dium and they were sent back in order to get seats 
n· 
together (Tr. 78) . Commissioner Richards said it was 
his intent to aid the athletic department and that Mr. 
ea 
Ki Crompton had been pushing the end result of getting 
money into the athletic fund and selling tickets in order 
·i 
ii. to get people out to support 'Veber State College foot· 
at ball (Tr. 78-79). He also stated it was Mr. Covieo's 
hi job to get out the crowds and to distribute the tickets 
·a1 
01 
to non-paid board members, hospital confinees, county 
employees and to generally use his own discretion. He 
'lated that it was not their intention to give tickets 
to those who normally would have gone, and that 
although this had occurred on one instance when a 
9 
ticket had been given at the front gate to an individ11J 
who had intended to go to the game, it was suii' 
sequently corrected (Tr. 79-81). Richards testifie,J 
that it was Commission policy that any expenditur, 
over $100.00 required one Commissioner's approrai 
unless there was some question about it and then 
1
: 
required two or three Commissioners' signatures (Tr 
82). He stated that most expenditures are not approveo 
at regular meetings. Richards stated that at the tu11t 
Covieo was directed to make up the voucher, there wen 
no specific instructions given to him as to what to put 
on the requisition and that there was no intention tr, 
make the requisition secret. The idea was to generatr 
spirit and enthusiasm within a block of people, pri· 
marily county employees and affiliates, and to heli I 
Weber State College (Tr. 88) . The primary purpose 
was to help the college (Tr. 88). Richards testified that 
Commissioner Favero signed Richards' name to tne 
requisition by stamping it on the requisition and that 
this was authorized by him (Tr. 91). 
Donna Adam, the employee of the County Clerk 
testified as to a minute entry which would allow an! 
Commissioner to approve an expenditure in an amount 
over $100.00, but two out of three was required if the 
expenditure was questioned in any manner (Tr. 93). 
1 
Al Covieo testified that he was an inspector ana 
apparently a general administrator for the Count) 
Commission (Tr. 94). He stated that Mr. Cromp:01:, 
appeared on several occasions before the Commisswn 
10 
tn solieit help for the 'Veber State College athletic 
program. He stated that he was directed to make out 
~i $G00.00 purchase order to Weber College, that h2 
rew1ested a secretary, Lorna Boam, to make out the 
requisition. He said he knew it was for football tickets 
and that he couldn't remember telling her what to 
put on the requisition, but that he and Crompton were 
talking arnl that she apparently absorbed the conver-
sation between the two and placed the statement relat-
ing to athletic scholarship on the requisition (Tr. 95). 
He stated that no one told her to put the purpose of 
the requisition as being for scholarships (Tr. 96). He 
indicated that the purpose of the purchase of the tickets 
as he understood it was "to prime the pump" for Weber 
State College and to distribute the tickets throughout 
the building. He said that it was suggested that he dis-
tribute them first to unpaid board members, county 
employees, individuals in hospitals and similar persons 
(Tr. 97). He said he kept a record of who received 
the tickets and who attended of every game, but did 
not have the records at time of trial since the season was 
om (Tr. 97). He said he would distribute some of the 
tickets to the elected department heads, and that some 
would pick up the tickets in his office and that generally 
1 
he was "running around" to distribute the tickets (Tr. 
98). He indicated that he had never gone to 'Veber 
State College football games before the ticket purchase 
h11t that he went at the time and generally had a good 
time. He did not use any of the tickets himself. He 
further indicated that approximately 35% to 40% of 
11 
the tickets had not actually been used by the peroni. 
to whom they were distributed to or that the ticke:.' , 
were not distributed into the hands of persons who J
1
,
1 
use them (Tr. 102). 
Lorna Boam, secretary of the Weber County Com 
1 
mission, testified that she wrote up the ticket purcha1 
requisition and that neither of the County Commission 
ers instructed her how to fill it out. She stated tha: 
either Mr. Covieo or Mr. Compton gave her infor!ll1. 
tion as to what to put on the requisition (Tr. 104-lOoi. 
Commissioner Bud Favero testified that he recallei 
when Mr. Covieo and ~Ir. Compton came into the com 
mission meeting and requested help for the Colleg1 
(Tr. 107). He said that Crompton originally soughtar' 
ad from the Commissioners and that this was turneu 
down. He said this was computed on the basis of $70.~11 
for the ad for 9 to 10 games which would be approxi· 
mately $700.00 (Tr. 108). He indicated that first then 
was consideration given to a direct scholarship n: 
$600.00 and that finally Crompton talked them inl1 
taking tickets (Tr. 109). He stated that subsequem 
to the determination being made, Mr. Covieo was toi~ 
to make out a requisition and that he did not tell theu 
what to put on the requisition (Tr. 110-111). H11 
stated there was no intent to hide anything in maki11~ 
up the requisition (Tr. 114). He considered the pa) 
ment to be for a scholarship and the tickets a donatin' 
to the Weber County Commission (Tr. 115). He fe\ 
the tickets had been given back to 'V eber County ''' 
12 
onkr to develop good will (Tr. 115). He said that in-
,tructio11s were given to Covieo to distribute the tickets 
g·enerally to unpaid board members and various other 
county officials (Tr. 114). He stated that some counb.· . ~ 
unployees were poor and that this provided a means 
to assist them to attend a game which they othenvise 
1rn11ltl1d have the opportunity (Tr. 116). He stated 
that their sole intention was to help '\Veber State Col-
lege and that the Commission had contributed on other 
occasion~ to .±-H clubs and other activities of public 
import. lt further appeared in the record that the Com-
mission hall made a donation to a 'Veber Countv proJ· -
e~ ~ 
rn rl'l known as "All Faces 'Vest" Tr. 34). 1\Ir. Favero 
g1 
1e1, 
,llli 
1eu 
H, 
\Ill~ 
said that his 1:mrpose in taking the tickets ·was: 
That instead of them taking that thousand 
dollars and doing what I sometimes think they 
do with it, to go out and give it to the people and 
let them fill them stands and let them come and 
see what a beautiful thing it is, that they actually 
can't afford to. It would be better for the com-
munity. It would grow. Maybe they would save 
from year to year to be able to go to this the next 
year. All this is stimulating business just like 
we try to do day in and day out with the In-
dustrial Bureau. Stimulate the mind that we got 
something here greater than just what we think 
we h:ffe got, let people talk about. That's build-
ing industry, that's building our county. (Tr. 
118-119). 
ti 11• Suh'>equent to the presentation of the evidence the 
!'ti triR! <'()urt indicated that he felt there had been a mis-
)' 
1 hke i11 judgment and the action of the 'Veher County 
13 
Commissioners, the appellants herein, was ultra 1.irt, · 
He stated that the court concluded as a matter of Jal'. 1 
that counties do not have statutory power to construr1. · 
"Universities" and "build football fields or Cniwr 
sities" and that that being so, that no power to apprr• 
priate funds to the Weber State College (Tr. I21i : 
The court felt th~re was a mistaken judgment b111 
that it was an honest mistake (Tr. 122), and the motin 
of the Commissioners was not questioned ,Tr. 1221 
The court stated: 
The court will state that a reading of tl1t 
Commissioners' testimony convinces the cour'. 
that they, the County Commissioners, belirn1 
they had a right to make the purchases enume·: 
rated and charge them to the county, and that! 
they did these things through no dishonest mo·, 
tives. They were simply mistaken as to the law 
The court further stated (Tr. 123): 
All right, the plaintiff prevails as to the fir~I 
three paragraphs of the complaint. The plaintiff, 
fails as to the paragraph four and five oft.he 
complaint, and that portion is dismissed w1t!1 
prejudice. 
And (Tr. 122): 
But the court finds that there was no frauil. 
no wilfull criminality, no corrupt or venal act· 
on the part of these County Commissioners, a~rl 
expressly exonerates them from any evil m?tn·i 
by reason of the concession made by pla1nt1tl 
in its closing arguments. 
14 
And the court-I don't know how we're going 
to do this. I want findings made at length on 
this subject, that this is merely a mistake in 
judgment on the part of the presiding officers 
of this county. 
The appellants submit the trial court erred in the 
construction of the legislative powers of County Com-
missions. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING 
THAT THE APPROPRIATION MADE BY 
1 APPELLANTS 'VAS ILLEGAL. 
The appellants submit there is no justification for 
: the trial com·t's ruling when a fair examination of 
the evidence and the legal powers of the appellants is 
made and the growing social and political realization 
of the extent of participation of government in com-
munity affairs is properly appraised. 
!, 
The evidence is quite undisputed and simply shows 
that the appellants, while acting as Commissioners of 
Weber County, appropriated the sum of $600.00 to 
Weber State College and in exchange, therefore, re-
ceived football tickets which were distributed to non-
pai<l county employees and officials, some hospitalized 
persons, and others in the community. The purpose 
of the appropriation was to aid \Veber State College, 
an educational institution in the county. The appro-
priation was aimed at developing community interest 
15 
in the athletic program at the college and "primiii: 
the pump" in developing the economic, social, and re(.: 
reational resources of the community. The trial couril 
found the action ultra vires apparently on the theor;) 
that because there was no express authority authorizinc
1 
county appropriations for "the building of univer:i.! 
ties and colleges" it had no authority "to make dorn.i 
tions to football fields and athletic funds" (R. 121:' 
The court also determined that there was "no fraua 
no wilful criminality" (R. 122). 
The respondent maintained its action below undt; 
the provisions of 17-5-12, Utah Code Annotated, J9ji,1· 
which provides: : 
! 
"Whenever any board of county commission·\ 
ers shall without authority of law order an!I 
money paid for any purpose and such moued 
shall have been actually paid, or whenever an1: 
other county officer has drawn any warrant in' 
his own favor or in favor of any person without 
being authorized thereto by the board of coun~ · 
commissioners or by law and the same shall bait' 
been paid, the county attorney of such coun~· 
shall institute suit in the name of the counfy 1 
against such person or such officer and his offi·' 
cial bondsman to recover the money so paid, a.nu 
when the money has not been paid on such order, 
or warrants, the county attorney of such count)· 
upon receiving notice thereof shall com~enci 
suit in the name of the county to restram tnt 
payment of the same; no order of the ~oard 111 · 
county commissioners shall be necessary ill order 
to maintain either of such actions." ? 
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Iii, The trial court also imposed the statutory penalty 
't( under 17-5-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.( 1) Thus, 
ur·I the rssential issue is whether the expenditure made by 
0~! the appellants was in fact ultra vires. 
lfl,: 
I 
f,.! 
ua 
dti 
17-5-9, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, provides: 
"The board of county commissioners shall 
have power to make and enforce such rules and 
regulations for the goyernment of the board, 
the preservation of order and the transaction of 
business as may be proper." 
The 'Veber County Commission had required the 
•j:JI appnwal of one commissioner on an appropriation of 
om $100.00, but if there was any question on the item 
I lhe approval of two commissioners was required. In 
I 
on·'i the instant case the ap_eellants approved the appropria-
1m.·.: lion, and, therefore, it must be viewed as being made 
1e:i 
im under proper procedure and authority unless it was 
•; 
ultra vires. rn 
ou1 
nh Counties are certainly units of government in the 
aw' State of Utah and arms of State authority. 'Veber 
n~1 County existed prior to statehood and counties, like 
nti.» ffi, other sub-divisions of goYernment, necessarily must 
ma perform many functions for their citizens. Emery 
der County ·n. Burresen, 14 Utah 328, 47 Pac. 91; State 
n!~ 1 '"Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66 Pac. 1061. 17-4-1, Utah 
nCT Code Aunotated, 1953, provides: 
tnt 
111 "The several counties of the state as they now 
de1 exist and such other counties as may be here-
! ill The pt~priety of this action is canvassed in POINT II of this 
brief. 
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after organized are bodies corporate and polit1t 
and as such have the powers specified in th]. 
title and such other powers as are necessaril' 
implied." .', 
Thus, county powers, which may be exercised bi 
the Commissioners, necessarily exceed those set out ;; 
statute and include necessary and implied powers, Ji 
4-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The Commissioner. 
of a county exercise legislative as well as executin 
authority and have, therefore, some of the substantial 
discretion that the legislative power envisions. 20 C.J.S., 
Counties, Sec. 74, p. 834. Of course, they also exercist 
quasi-judicial authority, Salt Lake County v. Clinton. 
39 Utah 462, 117 Pac. 1075 (1911). There is a pre· 
sumption that the expenditure of funds is for a proper 
county purpose, and courts may not substitute their 
discretion as to the wisdom of an expenditure for that 
of the local official. Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115 Uta!; 
476, 206 P .2d 153 ( 1949). It is submitted when thest 
factors are weighed against the statutes, evidence and 
precedents applicable in this case, the appellants are 
not liable under 17-5-12, Utah Code Annotated, 195,1 
The general powers of a county are set out in li- · 
4-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and include: 
" ( 3) To make such contracts and to purchase 
and hold such personal property as may ~ 
1 
necessary to the exercise of its powers. 
( 4) To manage and dispose of its prop~rti 
as the interests of its inhabitants may require. 
lS 
The interests of the inhabitants and the general 
perfornia1ice of county purposes appear to be the other 
limitations on the contracting and spending power of 
counties. 17-4-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, deals 
with a county's right to appropriate money and con-
tains only one relevant limitation: 
"No county shall in any manner give or lend 
its credit to or in aid of any person or corpora-
tion, or appropriate money in aid of any private 
enterprise." 
From the above sections it may be concluded that 
county expenditures must be for public purposes rather 
than private, and the expenditure of funds or disposal 
of property must be in the interest of its inhabitants. 
In 20 C.J.S., Counties, Sec. 236, it is observed: 
"A county board has no power to make ap-
propriations for any purposes other than those 
authorized by law. It must not violate consti-
tutional and statutory limitations and prohibi-
tions; and, in the absence of express statutory 
authority to do so, it cannot appropriate county 
funds for other than county purposes. It is un-
necessary, however, that the entire public be 
benefited from the object in aid of which such 
funds are set apart, and, in determining whether 
an appropriation is for a public purpose, the 
public policy of the state as expressed in its legis-
lative enactments is entitled to weighty consider-
ation." 
Thns. the expenditure in the instant case must at 
least haYe been for a county purpose to be valid. As 
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noted above, the needs of the inhabitants and the nect, 
sary and implied functions of a county may determliit 
whether it is a county purpose, subject to the limi 
tation that the expenditure should not be for a privai'. 
purpose. Certainly, at this juncture it is appare 11t 
that the trial court too narrowly circumscribed tlii: 
powers of counties. Weber State College is a publir 
institution, Title 53, Chapter 43, Utah Code Annotatea. 
1953. It is located in Weber County and satisfih 
multiple needs of the local citizenry, economic, social. 
educational, recreational, et al. Therefore, it seene 
axiomatic that an expenditure for Weber State Colleg1 
is an expenditure for a county purpose. 
17-5-80, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides: 
"The boards of county commissioners of tnt 
respective counties within the state are author 
ized and empowered to provide for the develo~· 
ment of the county's mineral, water, man-power 
industrial and other resources." 
Thus, the Legislature has expressly recognized tl1t 
obligation of the County Commissioners to endeavor In 
develop county resources. Broad language was used O! 
the Legislature thus evidencing an intent to allow greal 
discretion to be used by County Commissioners in de· 
termining by what means the resources of the couul.1 
will be developed. It would be an absurd argument k 
urge that Weber State College is not a resource 1>: 
Weber County or an industry of that county. Comr· 
quently, the Commissioners of Weber County werr 
clearly empowered to expend county funds in promrr! 
20 
ing the college and the activities of the college. See 
Laws of Utah, 1956, Ch. 32, Sec. 1, and especially the 
Title of the Act. 17-5-85, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
expressly allows the "board of county commissioners" 
to "expend county funds as are deemed advisable" to 
carry out the development of resources in the county. 
More directly, 11-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
allows counties to organize and conduct athletic con-
tests and maintain "other forms of recreational activity 
that may employ the leisure time of the people in a 
constructive and wholesome manner.< 2> 
Several cases have found donations by local gov-
ernment organizations to schools within their bound-
aries to be proper expenditures. 
In Southwestern Presb. University v. City of 
Clarksville, 149 Tenn. 256, 259 S.\V. 550 (1924), the 
rourt was concerned with whether municipal funds 
could be used to support a non-profit, private, sectarian 
school within the municipal liuits. The court found the 
!'outribution of funds proper because "the city was 
providing for a higher school education for its young 
men than otherwise could be afforded." In the instant 
case ~Ir. Favero felt the expenditure a donation, and 
certainly the county's contribution would be providing 
for participation in athletics of interest to the county 
11hich otherwise might not have been afforded. 
12) See also 17-31-1, Utah Code Annotated, 19:'>3, allowing the 
llO'e of t:1c tax:ng power for the establisil!r.ent of a recrea-
tional or tourist bureau. 
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A similar issue was before the court in Butler 
Compton Junior College Dist., 77 Cal. App.2d ii,. 
176 P .2d 417 ( 1947). In holding the expenditure 1 
public funds against a taxpayer's claim of illegality tL 
court observed: 
"The education of t?e young is a public pur 
pose of the greatest importance, fraught wili. 
no less consequence than the purposes for wh1cl 
the expenditure of public funds was appron,; 
in O'Dea v. Cook. ... " 
See also City College of New York v. Hylan, 20.j 
App. D.,V. 372, 199 N.Y.S. 804. 
The approval of the use of county funds for' 
state medical college was acknowledged in Smith r. 
Robertson, 41 S.E.2d 631 ( S.C. 1947). 
In McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Vol. Jj, 
Sec. 39.25, p. 69, it is observed: 
"Likewise, aid to a college, or to a publii 
school, aid to charitable institutions, donation· 
to a housing authority, and appropriations for 
incorporated homes for friendless women or fm 
industrial expositions, or to secure the locatw: 
near the city of a state reform school to wlucl 
it may send its youthful off enders, have bee11 
held proper." 
In Bailey v. Van Dyke> 66 Utah 184, 240 Pat 
454 ( 1925), the expendture of funds was approre· 
where Weber County gave $250.00 to the Utah Stal 
Agricultural College under contract for extensir,r 
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1rrrwes. The contention was made that the expenditure 
1ras not for a public purpose and that the statute 
authorizing such services was, therefore, unconstitu-
tional. This court found the expenditure to be for a 
public purpose noting that it was "designed for the 
public welfare., and provided "popular education for 
the benefit of those not reached by schools and colleges." 
In the instant case the expenditure of funds would 
aid the athletic program of Weber State College in-
cluding the athletic scholarship fund. This would enable 
persons to obtain education they otherwise may not 
!iare been able to obtain. Further, by "priming the 
pump" of community interest in the college and its 
acti\'ities the growth of the college is assured. The 
economy of the county is enhanced and industry at-
tracted. Further, the aesthetic interests and recreational 
pursuits of the citizens are stimulated and satisfied. 
The action of the appellants was solely for a public 
p'.lrpose, a county purpose and, therefore, not ultra 
rires. The wisdom of the expenditure is obvious and 
:ts such this court may not, nor could the trial court, 
brand the expenditure as improper. 
ln Wood 'l'. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 359, 374 P.2d 510 
(1962), a challenge was made to a legislative appro-
fJriation to pay various claims made against the State. 
One of the bases for challenge was the allegation that 
the appropriation was for benefit of private persons 
anrl. therefore, a gift of public monies and, hence, ultra 
1ires the leuislative authority. This court observed: c • 
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"In order to justify a conclusion that th 
power to approve and pay such claims has been 
taken away from the Legislature and placb] 
exclusively within the control of the Board 01 
Examiners, it would have to clearly so appear 
which is not the case here. 
"The Attorney General has also suggester] 
that the appropriation to pay these claims mar 
be outside the bounds of constitutional propri-
ety as gifts of public funds to private indi· 
viduals. It is an elementary principle of justict 
that there should be 'equal rights to all and spe· 
cial privileges to none.' And that thus there 
should be no discrimination against nor favor· 
itism toward some persons other others. It i1 
quite unthinkable that the Legislature coulu 
properly make gifts of public funds merely to 
confer favors on certain individuals, or to ap· 
pease self-seeking persons, who make preten<leo 
but groundless claims agl(.inst the State. In order 
to justify approval and payment there must oc 
at least some semblance of a valid claim; or somr 
relationship to the public interest or welfare, 011 
the basis of which some responsibility on behn!i 
of the State could properly rest." 
The court also noted: 
"We are obliged to apply the principle thal 
legislative actions are endowed with a pres~1p 
tion of validitv; and that thev will not be stricken 
down unless it clearly app~ars that the Legis· 
lature acted beyond its authority." 
The court determined the issues adverse to the 
claim of illegality. 
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If it is remembered that the appellants in the 
instant case acted in a legislative capacity, it seems 
proper to conclude there was "some semblance of a 
valid claim" for which the appropriation was made and 
the ''presumption of validity" (a factor the ~rial court 
did not mention) warrants upholding the expenditure. 
Certainly it is so since the appropriation was made to 
another public body. The appropriation alone, not the 
distribution of the tickets or the other allegations (po-
litical in nature) as to wrongdoing, are before this 
court. It must be borne in mind that the act questioned 
was simply the purchase of the tickets, and not the 
manner in which the tickets were invoiced and paid 
for, nor the manner in which they were distributed 
free of charge to people to develop an interest 
in supporting the athletic program of Weber State 
College. The question of legality then, as emphasized 
above, becomes one of the use of county funds as a dona-
tion in support of a local college athletic program. The 
appropriation was consequently legal. 
Prior to the filing of the instant lawsuit, the At-
torney General was asked to issue an opinion as to the 
legality of the purchase of football tickets which now 
is the subject of this appeal. That opinion, issued May 
20, 1966, as Opinion No. 66-073, ruled that the expen-
diture was legal, and since that opinion was an inde-
pendent determination by the State's Legal Officer, 
rather than an argument by an advocate, a raither 
extensiYe abstract from that opinion seems justified: 
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"All the authorities are in agreement that t!. 
appropriation of public funds for the prima1 
purpose of private gain is clearly an unlawfi: 
expenditure. It is specifically provided in ti ' 
Utah Code that, whenever the county commi, 
sion shall without authority of law order a11 .. 
money paid, for any purpose, the county attor 
ney of such county shall institute suit in the na111, 
of the county against such officer and his bond, 
man to recover the money. See Section 17-5-l~ 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Section 76-28·nl 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, also provides: 
'The making of profit out of public moot). 
or using the same for any purpose not autho1 
ized by la"), by any public officer, is a felon,1
1 
and such officer, in addition to the punishmt11 
provided by law, shall be disqualified to hoV 
public office.' 
The key to the issue presented in the purcha, 
and distribution of the football tickets is whetlw 
or not the expenditure would be considered . 
'public purpose.' 
The difficulty presented, of course, is: Wha 
constitutes a 'public purpose'? Would the ex 
penditure necessarily be illegal if individual 
benefit from the expenditure? This problem lit 
comes more difficult and his caused the cour!· 
a considerable amount of trouble. Manv court 
and authorities have held that an appr~priati01 
of public funds is not per se illegal simply br 
cause private individuals benefited from the el 
penditure. 42 Am. Jur. 756. 
''¥here the appropriation of public. funii 
or the creation of a public debt is pnmanl· 
for public purposes, it is not necessaril~· fC!i 
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<lered violative of constitutional prov1s1ons 
against gifts and loans of public credit by an 
incidental result which may be of private bene-
fit, but if the result is chiefly that of private 
benefit, an incidental or eyen ostensible public 
purpose will not save its constitutionality. 
156 A.L.R. 924.' 
Bearing in mind the concept of 'public pur-
pose,' it is necessary to relate the facts concern-
ing the purchase of the football tickets to the 
meaning of the phrase 'public purpose.' 
The 'V eber County Commission in previous 
years made contributions to the Weber College 
Athletic Department. Certainly, a contribution 
to a public institution that provides education to 
the people of Weber County and stimulates 
economic activity would not be disputed; there 
is obviously sufficient 'public purpose' to jus-
tify such an expenditure. It is noted that the 
general statutory provisions and opinions dis-
cussed in Part II would also allow an appro-
priation of public funds to a public educational 
institution such as 'Veber State College; more 
specifically, Section 17-5-77, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, authorizes the county commission 
to provide for the safety, and preserve the 
health, promote the prosperity, improve the 
morals, peace and good order of the county; Sec-
tion 17-5-80, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended ( 1965), empowers the county commis-
sioners to provide for the development of the 
counties, manpower, industrial and other re-
sources. 
In 1965, the county commission advanced one 
step further than it had done in the past; instead 
of making an outright gift to the college, 50 
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football tickets were received for the $600. 111 
expenditure. If the county commission ha., 
merely filed the tickets away, it would, in effeet 
be making an outright gift to the college as .• 
had done in the past. It was the opinion of t!: 
county commission, however, that a purchase au,: 
distribution of football tickets would stimulat·. 
more public interest in the college and prow(,, 
be more valuable than a mere gift or donati011 
The distribution of the football tickets to citi 
and county employees and other individuals ce; 
tainly benefited private persons. The questiiJt• 
presented, however, is whether or not the e1 
penditure was primarily for a public purpo1· 
with an incidental private benefit, or whetl:ti 
it was primarily for a priYate purpose with a1 
incidental public benefit. 
The apparent intent of the county commiss!Ull 
was to make a contribution to the college tl1a: 
would have more value than a mere donation o 
money. The purchase and distribution of tlit 
tickets not only provided money for the atltletit 
program, but also stimulated interest in thr 
school; the result 'sould giYe a dual effect t1 
the action taken by the county commission. 
A number of cases have held that the deter 
mination of what constitutes a public purpo'' 
rests in the judgment or discretion of the l~giv 
lative body, and the judiciary will not substitute 
its judgment or discretion for that of the legi• 
lative bodv unless that discretion is shom1 i· 
have been. ~mquestionably abused. Gle11d1ile: 
TfThite 67 Ariz. 231, 194 P.2d J.35 (IU~R· 
Pipes , v. Hilderbrand, llO Cal. App. Zd Gl.i 
243 P.2d 123 ( 1962); Slater v. Salt Lake Cit 
115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153 ( 194<9). 
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The action taken by \he county comrruss1on 
shoulcl be distinguished from a situation where 
an appropriation is made with the intent to pur-
chase football tickets for friends and associates 
or to gain political favors; in this event~ private 
gain would be the primary motivative factor. 
To insure that the purchase and distribution 
of the football tickets remains a 'public pur-
pose,' precautions should be taken when the 
tickets are distributed. Care must be exercised 
to insure that the distributions are not limited 
to particular groups, organizations, or political 
parties. 
If the foregoing precautions are practiced, it 
must be concluded that the \Veber County Com-
mission may authorize an expenditure of public 
funds for the purchase of \Veber State College 
foot baY tickets." 
On June 24, 1965, the Utah Attorney General 
issued Opinion No. 65-044, in which it was concluded 
that both cities and counties could donate public funds 
for culbral and entertainment purposes. The relatively 
broad powers of cities and counties in this respect were 
analyzed and summarized in that opinion: 
"The basic question presented necessarily re-
quires an examination of several subordinate 
points. These considerations are summarized in 
.J.2 Am. Jnr., p. 774, as follows: 
'It is to be observed that the question of 
the power of a county or municipality to lend 
its aid to a prirnte enterprise conducted for 
recreational entertainment purposes depends 
upon a number of different considerations, in-
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eluding: (I) "\Vhether such enterprise can I 
deemed 3: ':public purpose' within the gener,
1
, 
rule restnctmg the expenditure of public fun1], 
to public purposes; ( 2) whether the legislatw1 
has authorized the county or municipality 
lend its aid to the enterprise in question;' 
(3) whether the State Constitution contains 
provision, as is the case in many states, forbirl· 
ding local authorities to lend their aid to priYaJ; 
enterprises. · 
For purposes of simplicity and organizatim1 
the foregoing questions will be discussed in re· 
verse order. The initial question, therefore, iii 
the nature and extent of the prohibition con·[ 
tained in Article VI, Section 31, Constitutiorl 
of Utah, which provides: 1 
'The Legislature shall not authorize Int 
State, or any county, city, town, townshii.' 
district or other political subdivision of th1: 
State to lend its credit or subscribe to stotl' 
or bonds in aid of any railroad, telegraph nri 
other private individual or corporate enter·: 
prise or undertaking.' 
The basic purpose of the above provision i· 
to prevent any political subdivision with tilt: 
State from using public funds to aid privalt; 
persons or organizations engaged in busine~sr;! 
for profit. It is clear that a variety of serwu;: 
abuses would result if those in charge of tl11 
public purse strings could utilize public ft~nJ, 
to favor or aid private persons in their pecurnar: 
pursuits. This is to be distinguished from legt, 
timate uses of public funds or bonafide pt~bLil 
purposes, even though there might be some 1~c:· 
dental benefit to private commercial orgarnzn 
tions, and is further to be distinguished fron: 
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donations of funds to nonprofit organizations 
which perform functions which legitimately could 
be performed by political subdivisions. 
'Vith respect to the use of public funds for 
investment in privately-owned corporations for 
profit, the Utah Supreme Court has held that 
the constitutional provision above quoted is not 
a blanket prohibition against such investments, 
but is designed only to prevent use of public 
funds when the primary purpose is to aid or 
benefit the private commercial venture; but 
when the Primary motive is to invest the public 
funds in the public interest and for the benefit 
of the public by providing a desirable return on 
the investment, the constitutional provision is 
not offended. Utah State Land Board v. Utah 
State Finance C01nmi.Ysion, 12 P .2d 265, 365 
P.2d 213. 
\Vith respect to donating funds to nonprofit 
corporations performing educational, entertain-
ment and cultural functions, the general rule 
is well established that constitutional provisions 
similar to the provision above quoted do not 
prohibit such donatoins and grants: 
'Such donations are generally construed as 
directed against benefits at public expense 
attempted in behalf of individuals, corpora-
tions, or associations, as such, acting inde-
pendently and conducting some enterprise of 
their own as are usually conducted for profit 
and are commercial in nature.' 38 Am. J ur., 
p. 94. 
It is therefore concluded that there is no con-
stitutional prohibition in Utah against counties 
and municipalities donating public monies to 
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organizations such as the Utah State Institu' 
of Fine Arts and the Utah Civic Ballet Socieh 
\Ve turn now to a consideration of the questj1.i 
as to whether the Legislature has authorizt' 
municipalities and counties either to make · 
donations or to conduct activities comparaol · 
to those conducted by the institute and socie!i 
'• 
It is reasonably clear that municipalities car 
provide educational, entertainmet and cultur,1 
functions for the benefit of the inhabitants ri 
the municipality. Section 10-8-2, Utah Coo 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides, in parl
1 
as follows : : 
I 
' * * * It shall be deemed a corporate puri 
pose to appropriate money for any purpo•' 
which in the judgment of the board of com 
missioners or city council will provide for tl1~ 
safety, preserve the health, promote the pro•; 
perity and improve the morals, peace, order! 
comfort and convenience of the inhabitanl1 
of the city.' 
It is also reasonably clear that counties car 
provide the services under consideration. Tt· 
broad powers of counties granted by Sectto,r, 
17-5-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amenu· 
ed, would seem to provide ample authority im 1 
such services and functions. Section 17·H~1 
Utah Codes Annotated, 1953, authorizes cou11 
ties to levy a special tax for the purpose of rai' 
ing revenue for exhibitions of produ~ts an: 
industries of the county, for fairs and liveslol:
1 
shows, and for comparable purposes, and spr 
cifically provides that the counties can accoffi 
plish this directly or 'though the instrumental;t: 
of a corporation not for pecuniary profit, * * 
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It might also, be observed, with reference to the 
broad powers of counties, that Section 17-4-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, grants to counties, 
in addition to powers expressly granted, all other 
powers as are necessarily implied to accomplish 
the functions of county government; and Section 
17-5-50 provides that counties 'may do and per-
form all other acts and things required by law 
not in this title enumerated which may be neces-
sary to the full discharge of the duties of the 
board.' 
More specifically, Section 11-2-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, authorizes counties to estab-
lish 'indoor recreation centers * * * or other 
recreational facilities * * *' and Section 11-2-2 
authorizes counties to organize and conduct 
'plays, games, * * * dramatics, * * * festivals, 
* * * community music * * * and other forms 
of recreational activity, that may employ the 
leisure time of the people in a constructive and 
wholesome manner.' Sections 17-12-3, 4, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, authorize 
the issuance of bonds by counties for the con-
struction of 'convention complex' facilities. 
Having concluded that there is no constitu-
tional prohibition against donation of public 
funds to the entities under consideration, and 
having further concluded that the Legislature 
has granted sufficiently broad authority to cities 
and counties to permit such entities to perform 
services of the same nature as those under review, 
we turn now to the question as to whether coun-
ties and cities can donate money to non-profit 
entities as perform such services. 
It is clear that public funds must be used 
for public purposes. This does not mean that 
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public funds must be appropriated only 
public entities. It merely means that th~ t1 
tities to which public funds are donated orai 
. d l 11 prop:iate must use t 1at money for legitu 11"! 
public purposes. The same rule applies e1t! 
though the money donated or appropriated l' 
been derived from taxation and ordinarily 11uull 
not be available to private entities. 42 Am. Jw 
pp. 756-60. . 
It might be observed that the Utah Leg~l: 
ture has for a number of years a pproprial, 
funds to private nonprofit corporations pr01:1.i 
ing services which might legitimately have orii 
performed by the State, but which, in fact, a·J' 
being performed by private nonprofit agencit 
For example, funds have been appropriated'! 
the State Welfare Department for distribut:q 
to children's aid societies, which are nonprot' 
corporations deemed by the Legislature to i,1 
performing legitimate public services. Chap!,[ 
175, Laws of Utah 1965, Section 13, Item~I 
Since the Utah State Institute of Fine Ari 
and the Utah Civic Ballet perform enterlar 
ment and cultural services and functions. : 
would be within the good faith determination1; 
the governing boards of cities or counties : 
declare such services as public services, ano 1 
make a reasonable donation of public fun. 
to support such public purpose for the benr; 
and the welfare of the inhabitants of the•· 
spective political subdivisions. 
The Opinion above quoted recognized that reas11'1 
able precautions and safeguards should be taken 
assure that a general public purpose would be sefl: 
within the boundaries of the political subdivision DI' 
34 
iug the donation and to assure that the funds were 
actually used for the purpose for which they were 
donated: 
Reasonable protections should be provided 
for in making any such donation. The govern-
ing board of the county or municipality should 
insure that the funds donated by it will be 
utilized to aid in providing the service or func-
tion within the particular political subdivision. 
In other words, Salt Lake City could not donate 
funds to the Utah Civic Ballet for the purpose 
of financing a ballet perfo)'mance in Iron Coun-
ty. This is to say that any city should insure that 
the funds donated will be used exclusively to 
promote performances within the city and any 
county should insure that the funds donated by 
it will be used to promote performances within 
the county, thus insuring that the inhabitants 
within the political subdivision from which the 
monies are donated will be the beneficiaries of 
the service or function provided. 
It would also be advisable for a city or county 
to provide that, in the event of dissolution or 
liquidation of a nonprofit corporation which re-
ceives donated funds, any nonused funds do-
nated by the city or county would revert to 
the city or county, respectively. It could also be 
provided that the city or county would receive 
an accounting as to the method and manner 
in which the donated funds were spent, and the 
city or county should specifically provide for 
the right to audit and verify any such account-
ing made as to the expenditure of donated funds. 
It is further possible, in order to insure com-
plete protection tothe officers of the municipal-
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ity or county authorizing the donation, to requti 
that the donated funds be spent only upon 11 
written approval of the city or county governui! 
board for the. particul~r function proposed. t'I 
other words, if a particular city were to malt 
a donation of $10,000.00 to the Utah Ci11.I 
Ballet, and the ballet society proposed to spefti:I 
$2,000.00 of that sum to finance a performant! 
within the particular city, the city commissw
1
,: 
could still require its approval in writing for!Ll1 
expenditure of that part of the donation for tnr1 
particular performance. 
It is therefore concluded that if the foregoin"I 
determinations and protections are made ani.\ 
satisfied, cities and counties can make donation· 
of public funds to either the Utah State Ins!!i 
tute of Fine Arts or the Utah Civic Ballet S11I 
ciety." 
1 
In the instant appeal there can be no question tb/ 
Weber State College serves a county-wide public pUJ·! 
pose in its athletic program and activities. Located u1I 
Ogden, Utah, the college serves the entire county irl 
a number of ways, and while the primary and immedia!1; 
benefit is that all persons within the county may fm! 
entertainment purposes attend the athletic functioru: 
and games, secondary county-wide benefits would nece1 
sarily include the local pride in the quality and sur 
cesses of the athletic teams (whether or not everyon: 
actually attends the games as spectators), local bmi 
ness generated through a larger and more active colleg11 
program, and the county share of sales tax generat~1 
f C · les etc at the athlet1'c contests. rom con ess10n sa , ., 
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From the authorities cited above, it must be con-
cluded that 'Veber County can legally donate county 
funds in support of any cultural, recreational or enter-
tainment function sponsored by Weber State College, 
so long as the function supported is reasonably avail-
able to the general public within the county. 
lt is not denied that abuses and illegal conduct 
could arise from the purchase of football tickets if fraud 
or bad faith existed. If County Commissioners used 
public funds simply to purchase season tickets for their 
own personal use; or if county commissioners used 
public funds to purchase a block of tickets which they 
then sold and persona!ly kept the money; or if county 
commissioners used public funds to purchase tickets for 
distribution only to relatives, or to members of a par-
ticular political party, or to a specially selected group; 
then, in all of such instances, the corrupt intent might 
well result in civil and criminal liability. 
However, the only conduct of the appellants that 
was questioned by the lower court was the donation 
' for the purchase of the tickets-no concern whatsoever 
was expressed by the fact that the tickets were dis-
tributed free of charge to those performing unpaid 
volunteer county services, and to others, but without 
any favoritism based on race, creed, color, politics, or 
other consideration. The pertinent observation is that 
none of the Commissioners personally used any of the 
tickets. Suffice to say that the court underscored the 
fact that the Commissioners had "no dishonest mo-
tii·es" (Tr. 122). 
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It must be concluded that the determination oft 
trial court that appellants' action was illegal mus! 
reversed. 
POINT II 
i 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPO~: 
ING THE STATUTORY PENALTY UNDE1i 
17-5-13, UTAH COURT ANNOTATED, l9jo.' 
The appellants submit that if the approprial[' 
to Weber State College was illegal, a contention ap~i 
lants reject, that the trial court committed error/ 
imposing the statutory penalty under 17-5-13, n! 
Code Annotated, 1953. That section states: 1 
I 
"Any county commissioner who refuses'[ 
neglects to perform any duty imposed upon l 
without just cause therefor or willfully violat· 
any law provided for his government ass~ 
officer, or who, as commissioner, willfully, frat 
ulently or corruptly attempts to perform an: 
unauthorized by law shall, in addition to i' 
penalty provided in the penal code, forfeit' 
the county $500 for every such act, to be r 
covered on his official bond, and shall be furt~ 
liable on his official bond to any person injun 
thereby for all damages sustained" 
As can be seen the penalty provision relates. 
more than a simple mistake as to powers but requu 
the person "willfully, fraudulently or corruptly':: 
tempting to perform an unauthorized act or thew~ 
violation of law. This section, therefore, seems 
contemplate the necessity of scienter and eril doil 
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1f 1 such as would give rise to a common law action for 
1s! ilece1t. Such being the case the elements for liability 
require a stronger finding to sustain the penalty that 
the lower court made in this case. Prosser, Torts, 2nd 
. Ed., p. 522. 
I 
I 
PO~: The trial court expressly found "there was no 
DE'! fraud nor criminal intent" (R. 23 etc.). The appellants, 
)jQ. · according to the trial court, were "simply mistaken as 
·ial[• to the law" (Tr. 122). There was no "evil motive" 
ip~i (Tr. 122). The judgment made by appellants was an 
ror I "honest mistake" if it was an erroneous judgment 
I rt.! (Tr. 122). The court dismissed the allegations of fraud 
1
: and intentional misdoing alleged in plaintiff's com-
i plaint (Tr. 123). Consequently, the court did not by its 
;es 11 
mb findings determine that there was the willful and cor-
iolat:: rupt act necessary to invoke the penalty clause of 17 -
s s~I 5·13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
frati 
an:! It is a general rule that county officials are not 
tot'! liable for honest mistakes as to their powers, 20 C.J.S., 
fell' 
ber!, Co1mties, Sec. 97, p. 884, and in the absence of bad 
'urtif faith liability for illegal acts has of ten been withheld. 
njunl State e.r. rel. Murphy v. Board of Commissioners of 
Oidahoma County, 95 P.2d 101 (Oki. 1939). This is 
ites •• implicit if not express in the decisions of this court in 
equ~ Salt Lake County v. Clinton, supra.; Bailey v. Van 
ly" i, Dyke, supra.; and Carbon County v. Hamilton, 48 
wtltt Utah 503, 160 Pac. 765 (1916). 17-5-12, Utah Code 
ems Annotated, 1953, imposes liability for a wrongful pay-
doill. mentor appropriation of money. However, 17-5-13, 
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is a separate penaltr P 
• I 
vision and appears to require a more intentional-a, 
willful showing of wrongdoing. This statute shou]d:1 
contrasted with the case where the statute grants:: 
additional recovery merely from the violation itst. 
Avery v. Pima County, 7 Ariz. 26, 60 Pac. 702 (190~1 
Such is not the case under the instant statute. It 1 
quires a separate showing of wilfullness, or fraud, ,1 
corruption not established in this case. Consequent] 
allowing the penalty was improper. 
The provisions of 17-5-13, Utah Code Annotatti 
1953, are penalty provisions allowing for a civil k! 
feiture on violation being established. Consequenil:I 
the provisions should be narrowly construed, 23 ,.\L! 
J ur., Forfeitures and Penalties, Sec. 37; ChriYtian.11! 
v. Virginia Drilling Co., 170 Kan. 355, 226 P.2d ~" 
( 1950). In the absence of clear expression of legi1! 
tive intent to apply the forefeiture provisions ofi! 
5-13 to instances of simple mistake as to powers 
judgment this court should construe the statute 
keeping with the strong and express requirements· 
the statute and require a willful or evil intent, at le:, 
a purposeful one to make an illegal expenditure. Sil 
this was not show the court should, at least, reverse:_ 
imposition of the penalty. 
Further, it should be noted that the Attori:, 
General of the State of Utah was of the opinion ti. 
the expenditure was lawful. Although this deter~ 
nation came after the fact it is not without significai 
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111 detcrmmmg whether the penalty was properly im-
posed in this instance. In State v. Spring City, 123 
Utah 471, 260 P.2d 527 (1953), this court held city 
officials could properly rely upon the advice of the 
Attorney General as to the legality of a bond issue, 
and that such reliance would preclude liability. Cer-
tamly, where the State's Chief Executive Legal Officer 
is of the opinion the action of appellants was proper, 
thus confirming the fact that this case at best is one 
un which legal minds may differ, it would be improper 
to allow the penalty to remain in the absence of clear-
cut willful corruption. This court should reverse. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the trial court committed error 
in concluding the appropriation made by appellants 
was ultra-vires. The role of government is undergoing 
change, and has changed substantially in the past 
years. The public expects more in the way of services 
from government, and if public officials are to render 
1 
meaningful service their power to exercise their author-
ity and fulfill their obligations must not be curtailed 
by overly rigid restrictions. 
The expenditure in the instant case was clearly 
for a public purpose. It most definitely was aimed 
•
1 at helping an important institution in ,;v eber County 
and contributing to the industrial, educational and 
recreational resources of the county. This was a legi-
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timate end and, therefore, quite within the appelia
11 
power. The determination of the trial court that 
1 
expenditure was illegal does not withstand proii 
analysis in light of modern day reality. The role,'. 
government in the development of local resources ai: 
industry is ever increasing, Abbey, Municipal Ind0: 
trial Development Bonds, 19 Vanderbilt Law Rent;; 
25 ( 1965), and the need for such participation is su:; 
stantial, Chamber of Commerce of the United Sla!t, 
What New Industrial Jobs Mean to a Communi~ 
( 1963) . Only by a flexible a pp roach can true groin [ 
continue and the expense of government be adequa!tl 
financed, Bridges, State and Local Inducement.1 h 
Industry, 18 National Tax Journal 1,175 (1965). nf 
judiciary must not, as this court has observed, intru~! 
into the policies of the executive and the legislali"l 
branches on any level unless the basis of the intern:! 
tion is obvious, cf., Utah State Land Board v. Ull 
State Finance Com'n., 12 Utah 2d 265, 365 P.2d i1 1 
( 1961). When the instant facts are so analyzed ii 
1 
apparent the lower court committed error. This cor 
should reverse. 
Respectfully submitted, ' 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
c/ o College of Law 
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